The future is history by Coker, Cristopher
IFS Info 5/1996 
Christopher Coker 
The future is history 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . 5 
Three versions of the future ..................................................................................................... 5 
Islam and the end of the future ............................................................................................... 10 
Africa and the re-discovery of the past .................................................................................. 11 
A history-less West ............................................................................................................... 13 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 
Notes ................................................................................................................................... 19 
IFS lnfo 5/96 3 
Introduction 
Whenever the West intervenes in the outside world 
it does so under the misapprehension that it speaks 
for the international community. "The Bosnian 
Serbs have thrown down a challenge to which the 
international community would be hard put to 
respond" observed an editorial in a major British 
newspaper, commenting on the remark of Malcolm 
Rifkind, the British Defence Secretary at the time, 
that the international community ie the West had 
"no appetite" for military intervention in the Bal-
kans.' In the spring of 1993 nothing confirmed 
America's fears about the continued viability of the 
Western alliance more than the failure of its 
European allies to punish Serbia (and its clients the 
Bosnian Serbs). 
Either the alliance should intervene, wrote the 
widely syndicated columnist William Safire or 
"shut up shop". In the eyes of another respected 
columnist, Anthony Lewis, the credibility of the 
West rested on the fate of the Bosnian Muslims.' 
Nothing that has happened since- not even the 
Dayton Accord - has reassured the Americans on 
this score. Instead, the dominant mood in Wash-
ington is a mixed one: there is little expressed 
optimism and little sense of anticipation. On the 
contrary, there is a sense of nostalgia on the part 
of those who remember the predictability of the 
Cold War years, and apprehension on the part of 
those who look towards the future and see even 
greater disorder. The United States itself is not well 
placed to meet the goal set out by the Pentagon's 
Defence Planning Guidance Report for I 994-99: to 
promote "the sustained co-operation of the demo-
cratic countries" against the tendency of the world 
to fragment into murderous mini-states from 
Bosnia to Somalia. 
No western country is well placed at the end of 
the twentieth century to understand the alleged 
"irrational" forces that seem to plague a world 
whose main political features would be unrecognis-
able to the statesmen of even ten years ago. 
Everything they know of societies such as Somalia 
reinforces the sense that within the world commu-
nity (such as it is) there is another world with its 
own laws and conventions, a world only tenuously 
related to the one which the West has known for 
the past half century. 
Three versions of the future 
From the right angle, the world could be seen 
as one large and magnificent firework display. 
(Madison Stuart Bell Doctor Sleep (1991) 
Let me offer three visions of this disordered world. 
All three bear out the title of this essay. The future 
does indeed appear to be increasingly like the past; 
it is also so bleak that much of the world can be 
said to have no future - the future, to use the 
colloquial meaning of the term, is "history". 
The first version is by the South African poet 
Breyten Breytenbach, writing at the end of the 
twentieth century in which, unexpectedly for 
many, the black population of his own country 
was finally successful in fighting a long and 
unremitting struggle for the right to determine its 
own future. 
Breytenbach writes of a world in which the 
prophets and charlatans, and the ideologies they 
espoused - communism and fascism - have finally 
been discredited. The conspiracy of ideologies 
ostensibly imposed a pattern upon history at the 
cost of murder - "the big kill intended to confer a 
purpose upon small death". But Breytenbach's 
world is one in which little has changed for the 
disenfranchised and dispossessed. It is a world in 
which one ideology- liberal internationalism-
dominates, masking the exploitation that is carried 
on by the hypertrophic rhetoric of liberal leaders. It 
is a world in which a new "ism" -globalism or the 
force of global integration - cloaks "private es-
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trangement" at home. It is a world in which the 
industrial societies of East Asia and the West 
confront the inhabitants of the rest of the world 
with a bleak future: "those exotically miserable 
continents constituting the ghostly subconscious-
ness of history". Many societies especially in 
Africa have "time but no history". In a word, they 
have been rendered history-less-' 
It is a world in which the "cans" and "can'ts" 
have taken the place of the traditional "haves" and 
"have-nots." it is a world in which decisions are 
no longer made by the old protagonists of histoty -
the bourgeoisie, the workers or the nation state, 
but by global forces. The future will belong to the 
industrialised world, together with those societies 
in which two groups meet up, often in conflict -
the middle class venture capitalists of the First 
World and the marginalised labour force of the 
Third. 
They include Breytenbach 's own country, 
South Africa- the only African country on the list. 
Others include Brazil, Indonesia, India and, closer 
to home, Turkey. Cultural forces will be vital to the 
future of each. Some of these societies are Islamic 
(both for the moment secular) states: Turkey and 
Indonesia (the largest Islamic society in the world). 
Others such as India have their own brand of 
fundamentalism, in this case a particularly divisive 
nationalism which has already led to communal 
conflict within the country, most notably in recent 
years between Hindus and Sikhs. Others are 
aggressively secular societies such as Brazil, with 
its teeming masses in the shanty towns perched 
precariously on the periphery of the major cities, 
although here too a new force, that of Protestant 
evangelism, may be more significant in future than 
the Catholic liberation theology ofthe 1980s ever 
was. 
These, in a word, are the breakthrough or 
breakdown societies, those who will either suc-
cessfully cross into the First World, or fail and join 
the Third. They will be the key to international 
security in the twenty-first century: the "strategic 
prizes" that the West will struggle to eo-opt. In 
Breytenbach's words they will either be reconciled 
to the future (modernity) or estranged from it. The 
problem is that when one is estranged from oneself 
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one is estranged from others too. 
The second vision of the future is associated 
with the work of the American journalist Robert 
Kaplan, whose article on the "Coming Anarchy" 
which appeared in Atlantic Monthly in February 
1994 painted a much more disturbing picture than 
Breytenbach of a world fast regressing into barba-
rism, a world which was about to be reclaimed by 
a history we had thought we had escaped. Kaplan 
has since developed his argument in a recent book, 
The Ends of the Earth.' His original article so 
impressed President Clinton that he talked about it 
for weeks afterwards, telling one I istener that it 
made him envisage the future as a "Me! Gibson 
'road warrior' movie~'. Under instructions from the 
White House, Vice President Gore ordered the CIA 
to draw up a study of nearly 70 countries consid-
ered to be most at risk. 5 
Kaplan offers a nightmare vision of a world in 
which the past has returned in the shape of dis-
ease, criminal anarchy, and the breakdown of the 
state system. it is a world in which groups we 
used to think were premodern ' warlords in 
Somalia, bandits in Liberia, private mercenary 
armies such as Executive Outcomes in Sierra 
Leone (the new condoltiere of the twentieth 
century) have returned. Afghanistan and Somalia 
have witnessed the reappearance of traditional 
military castes; Liberia the emergence of bandits 
and renegades; Colombia the emergence of crimi-
nal cartels powerful enough to force the govern-
ment to tear up its extradition treaty with the 
United States (the main market of the narcotics 
trade). 
In Bosnia, for example, well organised criminal 
gangs, based in Italy and GermaPy, have taken 
advantage of the country's division, positioning 
themselves perfectly to take huge government 
contracts and buy up state owned enterprises 
(such as the concession to run the cellular phone 
industry). These gangs are the only genuinely 
multi-ethnic organisations now functioning in the 
country, with their intermingling of ethnic Serbs, 
Croats and Muslims. They have a strong work 
ethic and appeal across ethnic divisions. They are a 
product of globalisation or global capitalism. 
What Kaplan 's vision entails is an "epoch of 
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themeless juxtapositions in which the classificatory 
grid of nation states is going to be replaced by a 
jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states 
[and] nebulous and anarchic regional isms".' The 
rich countries, he warns, will ignore the plight of 
the poor at their peril. For poverty will foster 
international criminality which in turn will spill over 
the frontiers into the First World. Indeed, the 
blurring of the traditional distinction between war 
and crime is likely to call into question the tradi-
tional distinction between war and peace. 
Unlike Breytenbach, Kaplan suggests that Africa 
will play a major role in the future, if only as a 
model of what is to come. For far from being a 
special case, Africa "may be as relevant to the 
future character of world politics as the Balkans 
were a hundred years ago. Africa suggests what 
war, borders and ethnic politics will look like a few 
decades hence". 
The third vision I associate with the recent 
work of Susan Strange, who paints the picture of a 
world which is just as violent as Kaplan's and just 
as unjust as Breyetenbach's but one which is far 
less dangerous to those who matter most: our-
selves. If the danger of war between advanced 
industrial powers such as the United States and 
Japan, and the next wave of countries coming on 
stream: such as Brazil and Chile, Korea and Tai-
wan, has greatly diminished, then perhaps the 
world market does not need universal peace or 
collective security against aggression. "Let us not 
assume", Strange writes, "'that because preventing 
war between the great powers was the main issue 
of world politics in the twentieth century, that it 
will also be the major issue in the twenty-first".' 
The favourite model for the losers in this world 
is that of the Underclass. It offers a patticular way 
of looking at the world, one which has a historical 
precedent. For in the nineteenth century the 
discovery of Africa was as much a social discov-
ery of Europe as the discovery of the "dark 
continent". The poor were seen in a new light: they 
were regarded as both primitive and savage, almost 
as "uncivilised'' in their manners as the Africans in 
the bush. Social reformers saw themselves as 
missionaries bringing faith to a people living in 
darkness. Many even called themselves "social 
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explorers" or "'travellers in the undiscovered 
country of the poor". Urban jungles were discov-
ered only a stone's throw from the Free Trade 
Halls of the major cities. The poor, in a word, were 
there to be converted to a bourgeois world, where 
they would be introduced for the first time to the 
distinctions of childhood and gender.' 
In the 1930s Frances Donaldson remarked that 
the middle classes regarded the working class as 
quasi-foreign. When they moved among them with 
a view to improving their lot, they did so as 
anthropologists or missionaries visiting "a tribe 
more primitive than themselves".' Today the same 
middle classes spend most of their time visiting the 
world as tourists. And if their itinerary usually 
avoids the world's trouble spots, they know 
enough about them from what they see on televi-
sion. They are culturally predisposed to thinking 
about the outside world largely in negative terms. 
This time their vision may be all the more acute 
because they use models of their own society in 
order to understand the outside world. 
When looking at the world beyond their borders 
they tend to think in terms of the "underclass", a 
word which was first coined to describe the terrain 
of violence and despair in America's inner cities, 
and those who lived in them, a group outside 
politics and the mainstream social structure, 
beyond the usual language of class, unable to 
protest or revolt, with no future beyond their own 
self-destruction." 
It is important perhaps, that the underclass in 
the United States is increasingly black. For Africa 
too is seen as the great failure of the twentieth 
century, a continent that, in the case of three out 
of ten countries, is poorer today than it was twenty 
five years ago. By 2050 half of the population is 
likely to be living below the subsistence level. 
Of course, the association of urban poverty 
with race in the United States is relatively recent- a 
product of the massive migration of African-
Americans into the northern cities after the Second 
World War. Similarly until the late 1970s Africa did 
not emerge in the world's consciousness as its 
most divided or troubled continent. That dubious 
honour fell to South East Asia which had been in 
an almost permanent state of war since 1945, or 
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the Middle East, which when not at war was in a 
pennanent state of anned peace. The 1980s 
witnessed a change. Africa produced three out of 
the world's four major famines. Disease, particu-
larly AIDS, struck four southern African states 
very badly. Today Africa accounts for two-thirds 
of the world's refugees. 
A final theme of the underclass debate is "the 
culture of poverty", a phrase invented by Oscar 
Lewis who introduced it into social science in the 
1960s. Like the underclass it means more than just 
economic deprivation. It describes an entire way of 
life, a feeling of helplessness and despair in Ameri-
ca's inner cities, where in some cases infant 
mortality is rising and life expectancy decreasing, 
not the indices we nonnally associate with a 
developed economy. 
In many African countries likewise, life expect-
ancy is lower than it was in 1950. Food production 
has been declining by two percent a year since 
1980. The population is by contrast rising substan-
tially, which, in terms oflower protein, may well 
result in a genetic deficit in the next century. Those 
to blame for the catastrophe are held not to be the 
underclass itself, so much as the social workers 
and welfare programmes which eroded their will to 
work, and the aid programmes which destroyed 
incentives for stable family life. In Africa the 
villains are held to be the Western development 
economists of the I 960s, or the World Bank staff a 
decade later, who encouraged African countries to 
expect too much of aid. 
Even if the analogy were accurate, or the 
metaphor useful in diagnosing a major problem in 
international society (and I am far from convinced 
that either is the case) the world's underclass, of 
course, cannot be contained or quarantined for 
long. Population flows arising from the movement 
of refugees will be one of the most serious chal-
lenges to the nation states of the First World.'' 
All three explanations of the disorder from 
which much of the world suffers share one thing 
in common: a distinctively old fashioned under-
standing of history. A 11 three writers offer us a 
quasi-Hegelian version of the contemporary scene 
in which ther West once again is deemed to have 
patented history, that of others as well as its own. 
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Breytenbach writes of a world in which some 
societies have time but not history, in which they 
are excluded from the historical consciousness of 
the rest of the world. Success or failure is likely to 
be defined by whether they successfully break 
through into the future or break down into the 
past. For his part Kaplan paints the picture of a 
world in which the big themes have been replaced 
by a mosaic of unclassifiable confrontations. It is a 
world which is themeless - "a themeless juxtaposi-
tion of events", a world which is also without a 
history - for what is history if it has no theme. 
Strange writes of whole societies which are no 
longer progressing into the twenty-first century, 
but apparently marking time. As the hero of Saul 
Bellow's novel The Dean's December (1982) 
remarks rather ruefully, the underclass is a "redun-
dant" class. When referring to its plight one can't 
even use the term "culture of deprivation". 
There is no culture there. It is only a v.•ilderness 
and damned monstrous too. 1Ve are talking 
about a people consigned to "destruction, a 
doomed people. 12 
Even if their accounts ofthe world disorder are 
only partly true, they each agree on one point: that 
there has been a major change in the structure of 
world history. In the Cold War years we lived in a 
single historical time zone - the future. Today we 
appear to live at least in two. History is no longer a 
dialectic within one zone- a battle essentially 
between communism and capitalism. Instead, it 
has become in our own imagination a dialectic 
between two - the future and the past. 
With respect to the old time zone - the future, 
that of the Cold War years - I am struck in this 
respect by a passage from the end of Marcel 
Proust's novel, The Remembrance of Things Past 
where the narrator declares: 
Not only does evelJ'one have this feeling that 
we occupy a place in time, but that this "place" 
is something that the simplest among us meas-
ure in an approximate fashion as he might 
measure with his eye the place ·we occupy in 
space. 
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Proust offers us a particular space: the space of 
memory. He aligned himself in so doing with the 
thinking of his philosophical contemporaries. In 
different ways, but with significant points in 
common, Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger 
sought to understand the nature of existence or 
being by exploring the obscurities of time. Proust's 
time is psychic time. He establishes a world in 
which characters meet in the imagination as well as 
physical space, a world in which there is coher-
ence between time and space, a world in which 
dreams can be realised.~' 
His world of time is also, of course, a search -
as the title of his book suggests - a search in the 
imagination: that is to say a voyage in a space in 
which men might one day live in peace with the 
world and each other. Space is the future, one 
which holds all men equal, one which represents 
the brotherhood of man. For one of the key 
features of Proustian time is metamorphosis. It 
transforms us. In getting to the future we tran-
scend ourselves, we become real or authentic 
human beings. The future, in that sense, offers a 
distinctive type of communion. 
In many ways this was how the West tended to 
look upon the rest of the world for much of this 
century. It regarded it as a backwater that could 
only be redeemed by escaping from its origins, 
from its history into History in the upper case. 
Something of this comes out from a remark by the 
Marxist writer Christopher Cauidwell who, like so 
many intellectuals of his generation, went out to 
tight sixty years ago in the Spanish Civil War. 
Writing en route to the Front he observed: "Eng-
land seems centuries away". 14 It was a significant 
phrase. Spain in 1937 did indeed appear to be living 
in a different time zone from the United Kingdom. 
Those who joined to fight against fascism con-
sciously thought of themselves as fighting to bring 
Spain into the modern world -one that could have 
no truck with fascism, or for that matter a catholi-
cism still anchored to the Middle Ages. Both 
Marxists and non-Marxists alike who supported the 
Republican cause did so because they believed 
Spain could only be redeemed by rejecting its pre-
modern condition. Those who fought for the 
fascist cause did so to prevent Spain from being 
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transformed into what others wanted it to be. In a 
graphic phrase the philosopher Ortega y Gasset 
wrote that what they were fighting against was 
their own "Japanisation". 
Later, during the Cold War, western writers 
referred frequently to history in their work, to the 
roads of history, those long straight lines which 
stretched unequivocally before and behind the 
traveller. More often than not they also wrote of 
voyages of discovery. One of the great develop-
ment economists of the era, Waiter Rostow, 
concluded a book in 1957 with an invocation from 
Whitman's Leaves of Grass: "All people of the 
globe together/sail the same voyage/all bound to the 
same destination". 
The idea of embarking on the same journey was 
also a theme of Marxist writing. Landing in Orly in 
1958, after spending a month in Madagascar, the 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty reported that 
he had seen the future of the Malagassy people. It 
might be intimidating to be force marched into the 
future, but there was no question of arresting, let 
alone reversing the trend. Nothing, he added, was 
to be gained by "recreating archaism". Echoing 
Rostow, he maintained that "we are all embarked 
on the same ship and it is not nothing to have set 
out on that voyage". History, he added, was 
comprehensible only in terms of transcendence. 
The present was the starting point for the future. 15 
The future offered the Third World an escape 
from the past, a chance to treat the present as a 
bridge to a new century. To cite a phrase uttered 
by one of Malraux's characters in his novel The 
Human Condition, "Marxism isn"t a philosophy, it 
is a destiny". You can't argue with destiny, of 
course, or even refute it. You either yield to its 
appeal, or rebel against it. "The other side of 
destiny", writes Octavio Paz "goes by the name of 
consciousness: freedom." 16 The true freedom 
fighters were those who did rebel, who insisted on 
making history on their terms, not that of the 
"World spirit", or "the Absolute", or the Zeitgeist, 
or any of the many other names by which History 
traded, history that is, in the upper case. 
For the most part, however, the freedom 
fighters of the Cold War preferred to tight in the 
name of the industrialised world's understanding of 
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the Zeitgeist. Angola's first Marxist President 
echoed Rostow when he insisted that all socialist 
countries, whether they were advanced or develop-
ing, shared a "common destiny". Even one of the 
more conservative American Secretaries of State, 
speaking a few years earlier, accepted that Marx-
ist-Leninist movements were in the vanguard of 
Africa's transition to the modern world. In a telling 
phrase he added, they were "completing the 
unfinished business of its emergence into the 
twentieth century" .I' 
In that sense, history in this period was defined 
by very Western criteria. It was the product of a 
culturally specific understanding of history. The 
present was a boundary or a division between what 
had been and what would be. It was a very special 
boundary, of course, because once a threshold has 
been reached there can be no turning back. The 
Romans knew that once the Rubicon had been 
crossed history could never be the same again. 
There was only one path that could be charted: the 
one that lay ahead. There was no mission abort 
option in history. Such thinking did not change 
with the Empire's conversion to Christianity. As 
Aquinas argued, even God cannot cause what has 
not been to have been since such a violation of 
time would be contrary to its very nature. Greek 
and Latin rationalism added to the concept. It is 
one that still dominates mathematics, logic and 
even computer programming." This is what I 
mean by "a common historical space". 
It is this certainty that we have all lost. Today 
the West finds itself living in an era in which much 
of the world seems to be reclaimed by a past 
which it thought we all had escaped. As the 
historian Eric Hobsbawm concluded in his History 
of the Twentieth Century, invoking a familiar 
metaphor: 
The old maps and charts which guided human 
beings singly and collectively through life no 
longer represent the landscape through which 
we move, the sea on which we sail [ . .} We do 
not know ·where our journey is taking us or 
even ought to take us. 19 
The post-Cold War world is one in which Proust's 
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work is still germane, but in a different sense from 
what I have been arguing. For the paradox at the 
heart of the Proustian world - of his concept of 
time as a historical space - was that it referred only 
to social life as a spectacle. The true world, that of 
the psychic personality, can only be built by 
delving deep into ourselves to regain the time of 
our inner lives. Proust offers us a space of 
memory as a reality, the exploration of memory, an 
unfolding of ideas and images which we recall as 
we build. Today that remembrance is often exclu-
sive, not inclusive. It is also often dangerous, 
containing as it does the memory of injustices or 
slights, real or imagined, of nationalist dreams or 
missions which are fast dividing the world against 
itself from Bosnia to Somalia. We are no longer 
dreaming together. 
Karl Marx saw with admirable clarity that 
capitalism would bring about for the first time in 
history the unification of mankind in a worldwide 
economic system, but he was blind to the reverse 
phenomenon: the persistence of national cultures. 
In a word, we used to think History could tran-
scend culture. It now appears that culture can 
transcend history, and in the process be revalued 
or devalued completely. A culture is primordial. It 
arises from shared emotions and traditions. it is 
essentially a way of looking at the world which 
determines our interaction with others, which gives 
us our identity, or a code of values on which all 
interaction is based. 
In transcending History, cultural forces seem to 
be more important than ever, Islamic fundamental-
ism being a case in point. In other societies some 
of the old state structures dating from the Cold 
War are breaking down though we are wrong to 
think that the forces responsible for it are neces-
sarily irrational or nihilistic. 
Islam and the end of the future 
As an example of the first process, Algeria offers 
an excellent example of a society which is in the 
midst of revaluing its culture after its progressive 
devaluation in the past 25 years. Alexis de 
Tocqueville quotes the French commander who 
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conquered the country in the 1830s as saying that 
colonialism would be as alienating to the Algerian 
people as the introduction of socialism would be to 
the French. In the event they suffered two proc-
esses of alienation: one colonialism, the other 
socialism. And of the two the second may well 
have been the more alienating. 
For in Algeria the war for socialism continued 
long after the French had left. The government in 
the 1960s conceived of its Five Year Plans or 
national development programmes as military 
campaigns, a continuation of war by other means, 
a war against Algeria's pre-modern condition. As 
one writer notes, the government related to Alge-
rian society "as if it were a military headquarters 
commanding an army on the battlefield in a new 
species of war called[ ... ] national development". 
The state fell into the hands of a revel utionary 
class of technocrats who were more at home with 
the social ideals ofHenri de Saint-Simon than the 
social message of Islam. "History was made [ ... ] in 
the imperative mood, in a Schopenhauerian world 
in which people lived as if all that mattered was the 
will to power."" 
The phrase "the will to power" recalls Friedrich 
Nietzsche who devoted a large part of his life to 
trying to secure a future in which people would not 
be ashamed of themselves or their ancestors. As he 
wrote in one of his very first works Untimely 
Meditations, when a people is ashamed of its past: 
no-one should be surprised if {a people] 
perishes of petty egoism, of ossification and 
greed[ . .] and ceases to be a people; in its 
place systems of individual egoism, brother-
hoods for the rapacious, exploitation of non-
brothers [ . .]may appear in the arena of the 
future. 21 
As Joseph Brodsky noted we all crave the future; 
that we can imagine the world other than it is is the 
mark of our species. History, however, is here to 
make "that claim, or the future itself, legitimate"." 
Unfortunately the Algerian people were es-
tranged from their past. They were encouraged to 
see themselves not as a people so much as "social 
forces" of the revolution arrayed in pecking order 
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according to their ideological importance as 
workers, peasants, or soldiers or the young, with 
peasants ranking below workers who were them-
selves divided into employees or self-employed. 
Others were dismissed as negative social forces -
such as the bourgeoisie, or the capitalist class, or 
the class of imperialism and reaction, typecast 
according to their roles as oppressive landlord or 
exploitative rentier. 
What began to happen in the 1970s was a 
change of consciousness, as people began to look 
at themselves in a different light. Its perceived 
haunts were the mosque and the city neighbour-
hood. And where socialism tended to mass iden-
tity, Islamic revivalism involved a large element of 
individuality invoked in the citizen's personal 
communion with God. 
Whatever the inadequacies of religion, and there 
are many: sectarian strife, stupidity of dogma, 
intolerance towards other faiths, it is at least an 
institutional expression of an idea- that in the face 
of modern life moral values are still important. At 
the end of the twentieth century the presence of 
God seems to be as necessary for modernity as it 
once seemed unnecessary in the minds of sociolo-
gists such as ]mile Durkheim and Georg Simmel. 
In the absence of God it produces what Milan 
Kundera calls "unbearable"- a certain lightness of 
being. 
In Algeria the government's response to Islamic 
consciousness has resulted in 60,000 dead in the 
past three years. The people alas are also capable 
of being traduced by their fundamentalist leaders as 
much as by the founding fathers of the revolution. 
But all sides to the conflict do appear to have 
recO!,>nised why culture is so important to moder-
nity. They have begun to recognise that modernity 
is not an end, only a means to an end: in this case 
the renewal or revaluation of the cultural life of an 
entire people. 
Africa and the re-discovery of the past 
If we diminish Islam by failing to distinguish 
between revivalism and fundamentalism as a form 
of revaluation, we devalue Africa by dismissing the 
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forces at war with each other as irrational, nihilistic 
or anarchical. 
The problem is that the West still finds all 
violence dysfunctional in keeping with its own 
cultural experience and its own conceptual stere-
otypes. It is not. As Michael Howard explains, 
"War is only a particular kind of social conflict [ ... ] 
The problem is the control of social conflict as 
such not simply of war"." For the most part, 
however, western political scientists, instead of 
treating war as part of social discourse, continue to 
see it as an aberration, a dysfunctional phenom-
enon which must be "managed" or "resolved". If 
we see it indeed as quite functional, we may 
understand better why societies are resilient 
enough to often survive it. 
Angola, for example, has been at war longer 
than anyone else. It has been at war since 1961. 
Eighty percent of its citizens have never known a 
period of peace. But the society continues to 
function and the state to operate. Do the Angolans 
feel themselves constantly at war as the British 
undoubtedly thought themselves at war with 
Germany for 365 days every year between 1939-
45? What Angola has lived with is a level of 
societal violence which at times is intensive and at 
others not. If we consider warfare as part of a 
larger spectrum of violence, we might look instead 
for episodes which represent war, and others 
which do not: states such as banditry that fall far 
short of it. 
We are also, writes Graham Shipley, not only 
historically reductionist, but ideologically so as 
well. We still look for the cause of war rather than 
its causes. We still see war in terms of political 
goals such as the fight for freedom. Instead, we 
should see it as a social goal. Aristotle classified 
war as a species of "'acquisitive activity". Moses 
Finlay characterises the Greek style of war as 
essentially a profit making enterprise." That is 
what it is for many of those involved in war today 
from the Sudan to Sierra Leone. 
States tend to fight to augment their power in 
order to enact an agenda. Non-state actors tend to 
fight for interests - particularly their own material 
well being. The warlords in Somalia, to take one 
example, were what the economic historian 
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Mancur Olson calls ''stationary bandits". They ran 
protection rackets for their own benefit while at 
the same time providing a service for their follow-
ers which the state could not match. For the 
Somalis war was one of the chief mechanisms by 
which they could move around in the short term. 
In many societies warlike activity of all kinds, 
including banditry and mercenary service, is a way 
of avoiding economic hardship. 
Where Third World societies differ most from 
those of the First World is that they are ones in 
which warrior classes still operate, and which war 
is honoured. But they are not militarised societies. 
Martin Ceadel defines militarism as "the view that 
war is necessary to human development and 
therefore a positive good"." That is not the view in 
Somalia. It was of course in Nazi Germany and to 
some extent in Soviet Russia in the 1930s. These 
were states whose ideology put a premium on 
martial values and military life. These were states 
that tried to militarise entire societies, exhorting 
their citizens to fight endless battles in the hope of 
winning the world's respect. 
Some of these conclusions can be applied in the 
societies which Kaplan dismisses as especially 
anarchical. The violence that led to a devastating 
famine in southern Sudan in the 1980s (in which 
half a million people died) was represented at the 
time by the government in Khartoum as arising 
from "a longstanding" ethnic hostility between the 
Arabic speaking Baggara peoples of the north and 
the Dinka and Nuer in the south. Superimposed on 
this inaccurate portrayal was another misreading of 
events, for which this time the western media was 
largely responsible. Too many journalists tended to 
find religious origins of the war ha clash between 
the predominantly Islamic north and a predomi-
nantly Christian south. 
In fact, much of the hostility was induced by a 
government which was strapped for cash, and 
deeply in debt to the international community. The 
Baggara militias were supplied with arms by 
Khartoum and granted immunity from prosecution 
for attacking the two peoples from whom the 
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) drew 
most of its support. The famine in turn helped 
depopulate an area of the country rich in oil in 
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which the SPLA operated, an area which the 
government needed to exploit in order to repay its 
debts and reward its own followers. As David 
Keen writes, the Sudanese state did not collapse. 
Violence compensated for the government's 
economic weakness. it also gave the Baggara 
access to grazing land, stolen cattle and cheap 
labour. Violence, in other words, was not irra-
tional; it was quite functional. It kept the state in 
being at the cost, of course, of the cohesion of 
Sudanese society." 
Sierra Leone offers another example of a 
society in which the state has voluntarily surren-
dered the monopoly of violence- in this case 
contracting out not to a tribe but a private com-
pany. Beset by civil war the government has hired 
Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African 
registered corporation, which has tapped into a 
new market - a massive unmet demand for secu-
rity. It has positioned itself perfectly in that market. 
it has discovered a market niche." Mercenary 
activity is only one of EO's many activities, thirty 
two in all, which include the production of educa-
tion programmes and mining ventures in Angola. In 
the latter it was paid 40 million US dollars a year 
fur two years to train Angola's Special Battalion, 
fly MiGs and modify training aircraft in combat. In 
Sierra Leone it has been employed since 1995 
driving a rebel movement from !be diamond mining 
districts of Kono in the country's Eastern Prov-
ince, a key mining area which the government 
needed to secure to pay its own employees and its 
own army. 
The role of EO, both in Angola and in Sierra 
Leone, must be seen against the developments of 
the 1990s, a rolling instability in Africa that began 
with the decline of its strategic importance to the 
West, the UN's failure in Somalia, Rwanda and the 
Western Sahara, and the reluctance of international 
business to risk investors" money in insecure 
ventures. Africa is witnessing a growing ambiguity 
in the gap between the public and private sectors. 
The regular work of companies such as EO is 
likely to bring a kind of discipline- and, in turn, of 
course, more contracts - than impromptu merce-
nary activity did in the past. The opportunities for 
such ventures are probably limitless. 
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A history-less West 
What is the consequence of all this? Quite a simple 
one. The deconstruction of the old order seems to 
be inevitable. International efforts to preserve its 
integrity are likely to result only in greater disorder 
still. The world should be allowed to assume such 
shape as the energies and aspirations of its various 
peoples may eventually assign it. The energies of 
the West should be engaged in holding the ring, in 
discouraging the internationalisation of the internal 
conflicts taking place. 
What we are witnessing is not the destruction 
of the world order but its deconstruction. If war 
does fulfill a function then seeing it in 
deconstructionist terms might serve a purpose. It 
might make the West a little less concerned with 
what is happening in the outside world, and a li!tle 
less inclined to see itself as the sole provider of 
value in the international system. Nietzsche was 
convinced that a culture could only revalue itself 
on the ruins of the previous order. But the impor-
tance he attached to historical continuity suggests 
that despite the violence of his rhetoric 
deconstruction was what he had in mind - a 
process which would lead to reconstruction or 
revaluation. 
The West experienced a similar transformation 
in the nineteenth century. In the first half of the 
century it was conscious, in the words of John 
Stuart Mill, of repudiating some of its oldest 
institutions and doctrines while not yet acquiring 
new ones. Later, Matthew Arnold saw the old 
system of dominant ideas and faiths melting away. 
By definition an age in which change is revolution-
ary and rapid has a dual aspect: destruction and 
reconstruction. Both tendencies were apparent by 
1830. After describing the break up of many of 
Europe's most timeworn landmarks Bulwer Lytton 
concluded "The age then is one of destruction [ ... ] 
miserable would be our lot were it not also an age 
of preparation for reconstructing."'-' 
The difference between the 1830s and today, of 
course, is profound. That is why the analogy with 
the early nineteenth century does not suggest itself 
to the western imagination. For although all ages 
are periods of transition the early Victorians 
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thought of their own time as an era of change ji-om 
the past to the future. To Mill and the Victorians 
the past they had outgrown was not the Romantic 
period and not even the eighteenth century. It was 
the Middle Ages. When they referred to the "old" 
and "ancestral" they meant the "medieval" or 
"feudal". The contrast today is with a world that 
sees the age in quite different terms - a transition 
fi'om the future to the past, a return to the Middle 
Ages. Neo-medievalism is now one of the most 
popular themes of contemporary discourse." 
We might assuage some of our anxieties about 
the future if we were to recognise that our per-
spective is questionable. it is questionable because 
we are not the society we once were. For we too 
have changed. We are now a post modern people. 
Kierkegaard believed he had glimpsed the 
coming of a post-modern sensibility as early as the 
1840s. A revolutionary age was one of action. His 
own, he regretted was one of advertisement and 
publicity. Nothing happened but there was immedi-
ate publicity everywhere. 
In the present age rebellion is of all things the 
most unthinkable. Such an expression of 
strength would seem ridiculous to the calculat-
ing intelligence of our times. On the other 
hand, a political virtuoso might bring off a feat 
almost as remarkable. He might write a mani-
festo suggesting a general assembly at which 
the people should decide upon a rebellion. At 
the meeting itself he would be able to create the 
impression that his audience had rebelled after 
which they would all go quietly home - having 
Jpent a very' pleasant evening. 30 
Kierkegaard penned these lines in 1846. The 1848 
revolutions broke out two years later after which 
the nineteenth century was confirmed in its opinion 
that the modem age had arrived in earnest. It is 
that age which has passed, which has given way to 
the anxiety of the post-modern mind, our own, one 
which for the moment is peculiarly western. It is 
an age which looks back not forwards and is 
consumed as a result with fear of the future. It is 
an age in which the West will play very little part in 
the non-western world's reconstruction. It is an 
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age in which the West too is being rendered 
history-less. 
Unfortunately, writers such as Kaplan are so 
preoccupied with developments outside the West 
that they have paid little attention, if any, to 
changes within the Western time zone which are 
rendering it next to impossible to intervene in the 
outer world, in that zone of instability which lies 
beyond its borders. The result, a deeply ironic one 
in the circumstances, is that the West is rendering 
itself history-less as others make their own history 
on their own terms. It is the West, not the war 
torn Third World, which is watching its own 
historical marginalisation. 
Let me identify three themes which explain why 
it is so difficult for it to intervene with success. All 
three reflect changes in what used to make west-
ern societies especially distinctive: its historical 
consciousness. Respectively they cover the 
attitudes of three groups: government, the military 
and the public. 
(I) In the past the issues at stake were histori-
cally clear. They were clear to Ann Morrow 
Lindberg who wrote in her seminal book, The 
Wave of the Future (1941): 
I cannot see this war[ ... ] as simply and purely 
as a struggle between the forces of good and 
the forces of evil. If I could simplifY it into a 
phrase at all it would seem truer to say that the 
forces of the past are fighting the forces of the 
jillureJ1 
In 1961 president John F. Kennedy used the title of 
Lindberg's book to state the reason why the United 
States had chosen to contain communism every-
where it manifested itself from Latin America to 
Vietnam. Either the West would ride the wave of 
the future or be submerged by it, or pulled along in 
its undertoe. The adversaries which the British 
army found itself fighting during the Cold War 
years: from Greek Cypriots to Indonesian irregu-
lars and army mutineers in East Africa, were, at 
least, easily identified as the forces of the past or 
future. The British army had no doubt that it was on 
the side of history. It might be deterred from inter-
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vening by the cost of making history on its own 
terms, or daunted by the diminishing capabilities at its 
disposal, or chastened by the risks of intervening at 
all, but it was not - as in Bosnia - possessed of a 
profound despair about the point of intervening. 
Even in the closing years of the Cold war when 
the Europeans took issue with American interven-
tion in such areas of discord as Central America, 
they did so because they were confident of their 
own reading of history. After the elections in El 
Salvador in 1983 the French government regretted 
that the government would probably use its man-
date to suspend any further negotiations with the 
Marxist guerillas, and thus fail in its obligation "to 
come to terms with history". The deputy chairman 
of the German Social Democrats was emboldened 
enough to tell an audience at Princeton that the 
West should no longer try to defend "outmoded 
historical structures", including the regimes to be 
found in much of the Latin American world." 
Today we are all historically at a loss. History, 
as an anonymous Pentagon official complained in 
1990, "is happening in a way it is not supposed 
to"." We no longer believe that history has a goal 
or a purpose. No single configuration or historical 
narrative can produce a theme. In the words of the 
novelist John Barth "the sum of history is no more 
than the stuff of metaphors". A chapter precis 
from one of his novels amplifies the point: 
The poet wonders whether the course of human 
history is Progress, a Drama, a Retrospect, a 
Cycle, an Undulation, a Vortex, a Right or Left 
handed Spiral, a }.[ere Continuum, or what 
have you. Certain evidence is brought fonvard 
hut of an ambiguous and inconclusive nature. J.f 
We no I anger believe that history is determined by 
a class or a nation appropriating it in its own name. 
Even American politicians no longer talk about the 
American Century. 
One of the reasons the Europeans have been 
paralysed by indecision in theatres such as Bosnia 
is that they cannot interpret the present with 
reference to the past or the future. Eve1ything is 
historical hut nothing is historic. We cannot 
determine what our present will mean to our 
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descendants. If we cannot make the present 
significant for them, we won"! be able to make it 
significant for ourselves. We cannot determine 
what the future will find significant or not. In a 
word, we have no ground of action. 
(2) The second problem is also a historical one. 
The ethos of Western armies has changed signifi-
cantly. It is a change which is likely to have 
profound consequences for peacekeeping opera-
tions in the future. 
Back in May 1917 the German novelist Erns! 
Junger, while serving on the Western Front with 
the Hanover Fusiliers encountered his first Indian 
soldiers. They were Rajputs from one of India's 
military castes or "'martial races" ~men from the 
First Hariana Lancers. As members of a military 
caste, Junger concluded, he and his men had been 
privileged to fight them. 
What does Niet=sche say of fighting men? "You 
must have as enemies on(v those whom you hate 
but not those l1!110m you despise. You must he 
proud of your enemy and then the enemy's 
success is your success also". 35 
One of the reasons western peacekeeping forces 
have met with so little success is that the local 
forces have despised their managerial techniques 
and their pre-occupation with media management 
rather than fighting. Military castes can be defeated 
in the field by a professional army- the Germans 
had the better of their encounters with Indian army 
soldiers in 1917. But then the army in which 
Junger served displayed many more of the tradi-
tional military virtues than the American army 
today. 
The Indian Army still recruits from its military 
castes - from 20 percent of the population, from 
the Rajputs, Sikhs, Dogras, Maharattas, and the 
people of the North West Himalayan Frontier. The 
Indian Army, the third largest in the world and the 
most formidable non-Western, has a military caste 
which the British did much to encourage. Like the 
Muslims before them, the British bowed t6 Hindu-
ism. Indeed they were so infected by the caste 
system that at one time their cavalry regiments 
made a return showing the caste of their horses. 
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The British merely made that system more rigid 
than ever." 
Elsewhere in the world Western armies have 
come across other warrior classes - peoples whom 
the Western empires had trouble taming in the 
nineteenth century. In Somalia, one particular 
warlord gave the British the runaround for the first 
twenty years of this century. They were led by a 
leader known in the British press as the "Mad 
Mullah"- a man who was neither a mullah nor 
mad, but a warrior and poet who was only de-
feated when he died of influenza in 1920.37 In the 
1980s the Russians came up against the same 
Afghans whom the British had never mastered, the 
Taliban and Pashtuns, the traditional rulers of 
Kabul and their hated rivals, the ethnic Uzbeks and 
Tajiks. 
The Russians should have thought twice about 
intervening given their own experience with 
another mountain people, the Chechens, in the mid 
nineteenth century, as recorded so tellingly by 
Mikhail Lermontov and Leo Tolstoy. Prince 
Chernyshev remarked as long ago as 1842 that a 
mountain people could not be pacified. Operations 
against them would only destroy the morale of the 
Russian Army, leaving its soldiers demoralised, 
disorganised and exhausted. 38 Chemyshev was 
writing of the Chechens a hundred years ago. 
When the Russian Army engaged them again in 
1994 it found itself facing the same tactics. War-
lords such as the Chechen and Somali leaders do 
not engage in decisive battles. A warlord's army 
constitutes his political capital. Spending that 
capital in a battle is to be avoided at all costs, a 
point the Americans might have recognised before 
embarking on the futile attempt to capture their 
main Somali antagonist, General Aideed. 
What should these campaigns tell us? They 
should tell us that a professional army such as the 
late nineteenth century British, could engage with 
Afghans and Somalis (although not always success-
fully) as long as it had a warrior ethos of its own. 
In India, wrote Hegel, in The Philosophy of 
History, every caste had its special duties and 
rights. While the Europeans said bravery was a 
virtue, the Hindus said A bravery is the virtue of the 
cshatryas- the warrior caste".39 In Britain it was 
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the virtue of a class, not a caste. In a letter that 
Winston Churchill wrote to Francis Alanbrooke on 
his appointment as Commander of the Imperial 
General Staff in November 1941, he reminded him 
of his friendship with his two brothers, one whom 
he had met in the 4'h Hussars while serving in 1895 
on the North West Frontier, the other while 
fighting in the South African war at Spionkop. Like 
other members of his class, Churchill also saw war 
as character forming, as a form of nurture. In his 
account of his first campaign, that of the Malakand 
Field Force, he extolled war's moral virtue. Its 
value lay in "the uncertainty and importance of the 
present (which) reduced the past and future to 
comparative insignificance".40 
Today the "virtue" of war is now under chal-
lenge at home. For armies in the West are being 
transformed slowly but surely from professions 
into trades. It is part of a secular trend in all 
Western societies: one that involves revaluation of 
a different kind - the introduction of commercial 
criteria into the old Victorian professions, one 
which encourages doctors and teachers, lawyers 
and soldiers alike to operate by commercial rules. 
War is now seen as a business rather than an 
honourable profession, one that has its own remit 
(cost effectiveness) and commercial criteria by 
which to judge success. Armies will soon be 
assessed by input/output charts and performance 
levels, even more comprehensively than the 
American Army was in Vietnam. 
All of this is not new. It is an offshoot of 
Manchester liberalism. Lecturing at the Woolwich 
Arsenal in the 1860s, on the eve of the Franco-
Prussian War, John Ruskin urged the army to 
adopt as its formula "no capture, no pay". War, he 
suggested, should be fought like any other busi-
ness, otherwise the army had no business fighting 
it. It is a philosophy which is hardly likely to win 
the respect of the enemies the West may be called 
upon to fight in the early years of the next century, 
(3) As for public opinion, the world of global 
communication - of instant news reporting - which 
has become part of the peacekeeping phenomenon 
in recent years, is also pregnant with significance 
for the future. Television images confront govern-
ments with public pressure to intervene. Images of 
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peacekeeping forces being killed, of course, also 
prompts them to disengage as quickly as possible. 
The attention that the Pentagon is giving to the 
introduction of non-lethal weapons which were 
first seen in Somalia in February 1995 is directly 
driven by contradictory pressures arising from the 
CNN factor. US politicians want to avoid scenes of 
American soldiers acting in ways which would 
bring pressure from an American public to 
decouple or disengage prematurely. 
Unfortunately, peace enforcement cannot be 
divorced from pacification, which requires a high 
level or intense use of force. It took more than 
thirty years for the British to subdue the Beggara in 
southern Sudan with which the government in 
Khartoum has been collaborating recently. Thirty 
three punitive expeditions were needed to persuade 
them to renounce such customs as cattle rustling 
which the Baggara now engage in quite openly. 
Those expeditions were violent. Crops were 
burned, families driven into the bush, or left (as in 
the campaign in 1917) to die of thirst in the Nuba 
Mountains. When air power was introduced the 
campaigns became shorter but the damage was 
much greater. Incendiary bombs were used to start 
forest fires. Herds of cattle, together with their 
owners, were often machine gunned. 
Air power was at its most horrific in Iraq when 
it was used against the Kurds and Marsh Arabs.'1 
In 45 minutes a village could be wiped out and a 
third of its inhabitants killed or injured, the govern-
ment was assured by the Air Staff. In the main 
when air power was employed, neither the aim nor 
the result was intended to be destruction. Warnings 
were mostly given, villages were evacuated to save 
loss of life, and destruction kept to a minimum. 
The aim was not so much to destroy houses, as to 
interrupt daily life.42 
The point of these campaigns, of course, was 
to bring peace - not restore it, for most of these 
societies had been at war for centuries. The 
purpose, claimed Air Marshal! Sir John Salmon 
speaking before an audience in 1925, was to help 
"a heterogeneous collection of wild and inarticulate 
tribes (to be brought] into an ordered system of 
representative government by the vote."" The 
purpose today is to restore order, to reconstitute 
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states which in some cases look just as archaic as 
the imperial structures they replaced thirty years 
ago. 
The problem with peacekeeping is that time 
zones run on different times, or rather in the West 
time itself has significantly changed. Culture, as I 
said at the beginning, is a matter of perception, or 
how we see the world. Our culture is intensely 
visual. We see everything on television. We see it 
in a particular way. 
We live in a world in which we have instant 
information. Information is circulated quite literally 
between TV stations and on the Internet, but it is 
not shared. We don't experience it as a commu-
nity. it is not processed or presented as news, only 
as data. 
What we see on television are not events, but 
images which can and do reveal the etTects of war, 
but very rarely its causes or its purpose. Like 
thermal imaging at night we can see soldiers 
standing in front of us but not the soldiers behind. 
We have no historical depth or understanding. 
The modem age, of course, was characterised 
by the news it produced. Nietzsche and Marx both 
accorded newspapers a central importance in their 
analysis of modernity. In our post-modem era we 
watch conflicts live. We do not mufl over news of 
events, but the event before it has become news. 
Unfortunately, news remains crucial to our capac-
ity to contextualise events and thus give them 
meaning.44 
What is all of this, if not a short circuiting of a 
historical time into an eternal. present? In such 
circumstances every death we see necessarily 
appears to be gratuitous, whether it is the death of 
eighteen US marines on one day in the streets of 
Mogadishu, or eighteen Somalis killed by US 
marines. For the Somalis the war was history. 
They were conscious of making it themselves. For 
the Americans, it lacked historical significance. 
Conclusion 
Let me return to my point about time zones. In the 
years before 1989 we were afl concerned about the 
temporalisation of history. In The Storyteller 
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Waiter Benjamin wrote about it in terms of litera-
ture. He wrote about the future in terms of "epic 
memory"' and called the epic a "different 
temporalisation of history" from the narratives of 
the past. More particularly he distinguished be-
tween the unitary memory of the novelist and the 
multiple short-lived reminiscence of the story teller. 
For Benjamin, writing in the 1930s, the story teller 
was dying out. Like most non-western cultures he 
had already begun "to recede into the archaic".45 
The epic (as a metaphor for universalism) 
persisted long after the colonial powers disengaged 
from the Third World in the 1950s. For they did 
not disengage from their imagination of those who 
had been dispossessed of their own history. Their 
ideas remained in the political structures they left, 
locking their former colonies into the intenational 
order, categorised as free market or socialist, or 
often a mixture of the two. 
The metaphor of poetry was employed by W.H. 
Auden to capture this dilema. As Caliban asks in 
his commentary on The Tempest (the first play on 
the theme of the colonial experience): was it 
possible that the old imperialist Prospero, not 
content with inveigling Caliban into Ariel 's king-
dom lets loose Ariel in Caliban's when he with-
draws and returns to Europe? "We note with alarm 
that when the other members of the final tableau 
were dismissed he was not returned to his arboreal 
confinement." Where is he now? "For if the 
intrusion of the real has disconcerted and incom-
moded the poetic, that is a mere bagatelle com-
pared to the damage which the poetic would inflict 
if it ever succeeded in intruding upon the real." We 
want no Ariels here, Caliban insists, breaking down 
our picket fences in the name of fraternity [ ... ] 
robbing us of our sacred pecuniary deposits in the 
name of justice."46 
The stories which Benjamin thought had lost 
their appeal are being re-told. The epic is losing its 
grip on the imagination. Marx thought that the 
alienation of man in society could be resolved by 
the eradication of differences. We now recognise 
that civil society (and thus civilisation itself) is 
based on difference, that the uniformity of the 
international system is alienating for many who live 
in it. 
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For Benjamin, time as the ~'epic" was ever 
expanding. For Auden it was enchroaching on the 
history of others. Today in the view of writers 
such as Kaplan and Breytenbach it is contracting, 
and with it the West's grounds of actions, its 
reason for intervening. 
it is difficult, of course, for western societies 
to stand on the sidelines of history. For it still 
thinks in universal terms. Even now it still pays lip 
service to universalism as a goal in terms of order 
and justice. It is more difficult still for it to delimit 
the scope of its responsibility for the consequences 
of disorder, without diminishing its importance in 
its own eyes as well as those of others. It is still 
reluctant to be condemned to the margins of 
history. Whether it sees the historical events I have 
described as significant or not, it is still inclined to 
want to make other people's history for them, 
invoking, as it still does, the language of Christian 
redemptionism. "We are not here to free the 
Somalis", declared Lawrence Eagleberger when the 
Americans went into Somalia, "we are here to 
redeem them." 
While the West must resist the temptation to 
intervene, it must also avoid engaging in a social 
pathology, one that highlights all the negative and 
dysfunctional aspects of the world situation, rather 
than the creative associations and self-help com-
munities which are growing up even in the poorest 
areas of the world. To stigmatise an entire conti-
nent - Africa - is dangerous, for it challenges the 
central claim of liberalism that values and moral 
laws are not the birthright of one culture. 
Those who made the mistake in the past of 
believing that they alone had values have often 
woken almost too late to the realisation that the real 
barbarians were not outside the walls, waiting to 
break in, but had been lying low inside for a long 
time waiting to break out. It is even more a danger 
today than it was in the 1930s for the outcome of 
the world disorder is the passage of migrants into 
the western world. In the next century the great 
challenge for both Europe and the United States 
will be this: can a multi-ethnic and multi-racial 
society also be tranformed into a successful 
multicultural one? Upon the answer to that question 
will depend whether or not the West will continue 
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to adhere to its own standards of civilised behav-
iour. 
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